Germany and France, while celebrating the anniversary of the end of the Second World War that also marks the beginning of their reconciliation, seem to be keeping a relatively low profile with regard to the Russian aggression of Ukraine. This is a paradox, both in terms of European history and current events. Unlike the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, or the British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, neither Chancellor Olaf Scholz nor Emmanuel Macron have made the trip to Kiev. This apparent reticence is striking when compared how involved Angela Merkel and François Hollande were in 2015, at the beginning of the war in the Donbas.
It is as if the two countries had been caught off guard by a conflict whose outbreak they had not even foreseen, let alone the extent and consequences. Berlin is experiencing this news as a brutal challenge to its economic model, its energy choices, its policy of openness towards Vladimir Putin and its pacifism.
In Paris, the conflict is a direct challenge to Emmanuel Macron's gamble of reaching out to the Russian president, an approach designed to try to anchor Russia to Europe. Busy managing the economic, energy and social consequences of the war, as well as the brutal challenge it poses in terms of defense, the German and French leaders are not exercising the leadership on this issue that one might expect of them.
Yet, six months ago, Olaf Scholz's "tricolour" coalition, which brings together social democrats, ecologists and liberals, showed unprecedented convergence with Paris. By making European integration a priority, by taking up the concept of "strategic autonomy" for Europe, by recognizing the need for a common industrial policy, Germany finally seemed to respond positively to Mr. Macron's Sorbonne speech that Angela Merkel, in 2017, had left unanswered.
Unprecedented crisis
But since this promising start, it has not been easy to understand what Mr. Scholz wants and thinks. The chancellor's display of a clear European ambition with regard to sanctions, aid to Ukraine and breaking with Russian sources of energy supply is matched by a great deal of discretion. It is true that he is facing a series of fundamental questions, including Germany's relationship with the war and with globalization. He has begun to make these choices, notably by accepting the delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine, but the management of a coalition government does not simplify matters.
The situation in this country only makes progress towards a stronger, more autonomous Europe more necessary than ever. In the context of an unprecedented crisis, which puts at stake not only the values but also the security of the European Union, Paris and Berlin have, as they often do, a leading role to play. The expected adoption, at the beginning of June, of a special fund of 100 billion euros for the German army, announced by Mr. Scholz three days after the beginning of the conflict, should allow for Germany to end its hesitations by committing itself to devote a substantial part of the fund to European defense projects. On defense, like on economic recovery and on the decision-making processes in the Union, the time has come to take a series of strong actions.