Legacies of the four-day Indo-Pakistan war

The brief yet intense escalation of hostilities between India and Pakistan last month has further exposed the fragile nature of South Asia’s security landscape. The four-day tit-for-tat cross-border military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed rivals has significantly undermined prospects for normalization, redefining the rules of engagement and signaling a shift in how both countries may manage their relationship moving forward. What began as a terrorist attack on Indian tourists in the Pahalgam region of the disputed India-administered Kashmir on April 22, resulting in the deaths of 26 people, quickly escalated into a significant diplomatic and military crisis in early May. India promptly accused Pakistan of orchestrating the terror attacks and used the incident as justification to revise its military doctrine through the launch of Operation Sindoor — a broad-based response integrating both kinetic and non-kinetic measures to carry out deep strikes within Pakistan, reinforced by a forceful diplomatic campaign.

India resets terms of engagement with Pakistan

In a public speech highlighting the goals of Operation Sindoor, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced what he described as reaching a “new normal,” signaling a decisive departure from India’s earlier restraint, long shaped by Pakistan’s nuclear threat. He emphasized that the new approach centered on firm and unyielding retaliation against terrorist attacks, including cross-border military operations and a refusal to distinguish between militant groups and their state sponsors — effectively laying responsibility directly on Pakistan for any acts of terrorism on Indian soil. Modi’s clear message that India would no longer be deterred by the threat of nuclear escalation also signaled a willingness, despite the risks, to take bold and proactive actions, marking a significant shift in New Delhi’s strategic posture toward Islamabad. Pakistan, in response to the damage inflicted by Operation Sindoor, initiated its own military campaign, named Bunyan-un-Marsoos, with strikes on key Indian military targets.

As the two countries climbed the ladder of escalation, US President Donald Trump announced through social media an agreement on a cease-fire that halted the hostilities on May 10, though prospects for lasting peace remain doubtful. Inflammatory rhetoric and the unresolved diplomatic deadlock continue to fuel tensions. A significant divide exists between India and Pakistan, with each celebrating its own military campaign as a victory and viewing the outcome of the confrontation through a zero-sum lens. This has made the aftermath more complex and contentious than the conflict itself as both sides revealed how they intended to respond to future attacks.

In this context, key questions have emerged as to what this tenuous truce means for the deep-seated India-Pakistan rivalry, the implications for the combatants’ relationships with the US, and the extent of the impact the crisis has had on the long-term stability of South Asia.

To begin with, the cease-fire quickly sparked controversy, with disagreements over who should get credit for the deal. Much of the international community, including Pakistan, attributed the truce to US mediation efforts, especially after President Trump boasted about his administration’s “heroic and historic” role in brokering the cease-fire. Since then, Trump has repeatedly hailed his administration for securing a major diplomatic victory that helped prevent a “bad nuclear war.” He also attempted to leverage the power of trade as a key tool of pressure on India and Pakistan, which in his view only the US was capable of exercising. While offering increased trade benefits as an incentive for peace, Trump claimed to have threatened both countries with economic consequences if the conflict escalated. Seeking to capitalize on his perceived success, he expressed his desire to play a more active role in resolving the decades-old Kashmir dispute — the root cause of tensions between India and Pakistan.

Evolving US-India-Pakistan relations post-cease-fire

While Pakistan welcomed Trump’s involvement, India reacted with evident dissatisfaction. At the core of New Delhi’s frustration was what it perceived as a serious shortfall in US support, especially given India’s status as a key US strategic partner in the Asia-Pacific. Drawing a parallel with the blow on terrorism inflicted by the US raid that killed Osama bin Laden, India had expected to strike a chord in the US with its launching of cross-border strikes on terrorist assets. New Delhi hoped that Washington would join it in condemning Pakistan as a primary sponsor of terrorism and pressure Islamabad to change its conduct. But Washington has instead chosen to remain neutral rather than openly side with New Delhi. To demonstrate its frustration, India has dismissed Trump’s assertion that the US was key to securing the cease-fire and swiftly turned down his proposal to mediate the Kashmir dispute.

New Delhi insisted that the cease-fire was the result of bilateral talks initiated by Islamabad, which was unable to withstand the pressure of Operation Sindoor. India denied any role of trade threats or concessions during discussions with US officials and firmly rejected third-party mediation, signaling its intent to prevent the Kashmir dispute from becoming internationalized. Furthermore, India minimized President Trump’s claim that the conflict was fully settled, with Prime Minister Modi warning that the cease-fire was merely a temporary pause rather than an end to the offensive. He emphasized that the cease-fire terms are conditional and India’s future actions will be dictated by Pakistan’s behavior — implying that any terrorist attack on Indian soil is bound to trigger renewed strikes on Pakistan. With this strategic signaling, New Delhi appears to be indicating to Washington its preference to manage relations with Islamabad independently, welcoming external involvement only when it clearly supports India’s interests.

India’s growing reluctance to cooperate with the United States may strain their bilateral relationship. However, this stance has provided Islamabad with an opportunity to strengthen its ties with Washington. Pakistan has not only conveyed its gratitude to President Trump for his role in averting war but has also welcomed his willingness to bring the Kashmir issue to the forefront of international attention — an aim Islamabad has long pursued in its efforts to internationalize the dispute. Additionally, Pakistan has reaffirmed its commitment to a cease-fire, emphasizing that it would act only if provoked by Indian aggression. At the same time, Islamabad has already begun exploring opportunities to broaden its partnership with Washington, particularly in trade, investment, and wider economic collaboration. In a notable advancement, Pakistan has proposed a zero-tariff bilateral agreement in recently opened trade negotiations. Furthermore, it has signaled its intention to increase imports from the United States, especially crude oil, as a gesture of goodwill.

Most notably, Pakistan has entered into a high-stakes cryptocurrency agreement with World Liberty Financial (WLF), a cryptocurrency firm backed by the Trump family. At a recent high-profile cryptocurrency conference in Las Vegas, attended by US Vice President JD Vance and President Trump’s sons, Pakistan’s minister for crypto and blockchain made a compelling pitch to crypto and artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure developers. He invited them to invest in Pakistan, highlighting the country’s competitive advantages in low-cost, high-yield bitcoin mining and the establishment of AI data centers. These initiatives further complement Pakistan’s recent decision to offer concessions to encourage US companies to invest in its untapped rare earth mineral reserves, demonstrating its willingness to deepen cooperation between the two countries — an effort that has garnered significant interest from the Trump administration.

For Pakistan, securing favorable attention from Washington has become a strategic priority. In light of President Trump’s interest in critical earth minerals and establishing a strategic Bitcoin reserve — treating cryptocurrency as vital as petroleum — Pakistan is proactively positioning itself to meet these US priorities. It views the United States not only as a potential stabilizing actor in the region but also as a security guarantor against Indian military threats. Simultaneously, Pakistan’s strategic partnership with China continues to bolster its defense capabilities, forming a dual-track deterrence strategy. Islamabad now finds itself in a potentially advantageous position, able to benefit from strong ties with both China and the United States without jeopardizing either relationship.

Renewed tensions with India have fueled a wave of nationalism in Pakistan, strengthened the military’s role, and recalibrated civil-military relations that had previously been strained by political divisions. The military is increasingly seen by the public as the true custodian of Pakistan’s sovereignty, praised for what many view as its robust response to Indian provocations. This surge in public support has empowered the military to promote its “Only Pakistan” doctrine, a framework that places national security and economic sovereignty at the forefront.

In response to India’s “new normal,” where Prime Minister Modi is widely seen as the face of Indian strength, Pakistan has embraced its own “new normal,” with civilian leaders backing Army Chief Asim Munir as the lasting symbolic figure of Pakistan’s strength and hardline policy vis-à-vis India. The most striking example of this shift is the elevation of Munir to the rank of field marshal — a title not held in Pakistan since former President Field Marshal Ayub Khan. According to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s office, the promotion recognizes Munir’s leadership during Operation Bunyan-ul-Marsoos and his role in safeguarding national security.

Although largely ceremonial, the rank of field marshal — equivalent to a five-star general, the highest military designation — carries considerable symbolic and strategic weight due to its permanence. Unlike time-bound appointments, this title is held for life, granting Field Marshal Munir an enduring role in shaping national policy and ensuring continuity in strategic decision-making, particularly in relation to India. Traditionally, Pakistan’s foreign and security policies have shifted with each change in military leadership. Munir’s elevation marks a departure from that pattern, offering international actors a more permanent figure to engage with.

The rank also places Munir above the Army chief, meaning that future generals will be expected to consult him on critical matters of national security and policy. This effectively consolidates his influence within the military hierarchy. In a country often seen as lacking long-term leadership continuity, Munir’s promotion fills both a symbolic and functional void. With this elevation, he is in a stronger position to implement his doctrine of building a “hard state” characterized by strong, hybrid civil-military institutions focused on economic and security governance, national order, and strength.

In a recent interaction with Pakistani academics, Munir outlined his vision for transforming Pakistan into a strong state — one anchored in institutions that operate independently, free from political interference, personal interests, and corruption. His remarks reflected not only a governance-oriented outlook but also conveyed an implicit message to the public: that his leadership could serve as a stabilizing force in contrast to divisive political figures driven by narrow agendas.

Still, Munir’s promotion has not gone unchallenged. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan — currently incarcerated yet retaining broad popular support — mocked the move, claiming the title of “king” might have been more fitting for Munir, given what he described as the “law of the jungle” prevailing in the country. Nonetheless, Munir’s elevated position now secures him from the kind of political vulnerability faced by both civilian and military leaders in the past.

However, maintaining national strength may not only require assertive leadership — it will also demand political restraint and strategic judgment. A key test lies in how Munir manages his relationship with Khan, who has indicated an interest in dialogue with the military establishment as part of efforts to secure his release. Unlike previous confrontations, a freed Khan may no longer possess the leverage to challenge Munir’s centrality in Pakistan’s power structure. Ultimately, Munir’s greatest challenge lies in how he chooses to wield this historic role — whether he functions with rigid control or careful balance, and how he navigates Pakistan’s polarized political terrain. It is apparent that his domestic and foreign policy decisions will shape both his legacy and Pakistan’s future trajectory.

The road ahead

In the evolving strategic rivalry of South Asia, one fact has become increasingly clear: the United States has emerged as a key stabilizing force — a role even a major power like China has yet to assert. Consequently, US involvement, or at least the perception of such involvement, in the region has deepened. Aware of President Trump’s reluctance to entangle the US in foreign conflicts that fall outside core American interests, both India and Pakistan have sought to elevate South Asia’s strategic importance on Washington’s radar, each attempting to align US engagement with their respective national priorities.

Yet for Trump, such engagement comes with clear conditions. His approach hinges on both India and Pakistan honoring their commitments to the United States and acting in ways that support US interests — most notably by upholding the cease-fire and contributing to regional stability. Casting himself as a peacemaker, Trump has relied on a calculated blend of incentives and pressure to shape global disputes. He has applied this same approach to the India-Pakistan conflict dynamic, recently warning that the United States would withhold trade engagement from either country if hostilities were to resume. This stance reflects a broader reversion — seen in Trump’s rhetoric and echoed by segments of the international community — to a “hyphenated” view of India and Pakistan, treating them as a single geopolitical equation rather than as distinct strategic actors.

For India, this re-hyphenation is particularly troubling. Over the past decade, New Delhi has invested significant diplomatic capital in projecting itself as a rising global power, deliberately distancing its international identity from regional entanglements with Pakistan. The reemergence of a joint narrative undermines this carefully curated image. In response, India has ramped up its diplomatic outreach to Washington, not only to reaffirm its strategic partnership with the United States but also to underscore the autonomy and global orientation of its foreign policy. Central to this effort is India’s determination to prevent the internationalization of the Kashmir issue and to resist any diplomatic pressure that might force it to concede to Pakistan’s demands. This has led to a more assertive Indian diplomatic posture, aimed at preempting third-party mediation and framing its confrontations with Pakistan as internal security matters.

By contrast, Pakistan views the revival of the hyphenation framework as an opportunity to regain strategic relevance. It leverages this paradigm to retain international visibility — especially on the Kashmir issue, which it seeks to elevate on the global diplomatic stage. In countering India’s outreach, Pakistan has intensified its own diplomatic efforts, sending delegations to Washington and other key regional capitals. It presents itself as open to dialogue, ideally mediated by a neutral third party such as the United States. In doing so, Pakistan seeks to position itself as the more flexible and peace-oriented actor, while portraying India’s resistance to mediation as rigid and obstructive.

India and Pakistan hold markedly different expectations of the United States. At a minimum, New Delhi expects Washington to refrain from intervening in its bilateral disputes with Islamabad, particularly on sensitive issues like Kashmir. Islamabad, on the other hand, views continued US linking of India and Pakistan as strategically beneficial. It allows Islamabad to remain diplomatically relevant, especially on the Kashmir issue, and acts as a form of indirect deterrence against potential Indian military adventurism. Pakistan expects the United States to maintain this deterrent effect through sustained hyphenation, ensuring that India’s actions remain under international scrutiny and that the conflict retains a global dimension. Whether the United States — especially under a transactional and unpredictable leader like Trump — can navigate these competing expectations and play a constructive role in the region remains uncertain. Managing ties with two long-standing adversaries, each with fundamentally opposing agendas, is no easy task.

Conclusion

What began as a bilateral rivalry between India and Pakistan has increasingly spilled over onto the international stage, where zero-sum calculations continue to shape both countries' strategic outlooks. Today, the conflict has evolved into a contest of diplomatic signaling, as each state seeks to mobilize international support to strengthen its position. Yet, despite these efforts, neither India nor Pakistan is capable of forging a binary bloc-based alignment akin to the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union — or even the current US-China strategic competition. For both, the ultimate external arbiter remains the United States.

As India adjusts to the new reality and Pakistan attempts to define its own version of that reality, the potential for conflict escalation remains ever present. Still, in the fluid realm of international politics, a single significant development could easily upend the current equilibrium. If both nations redirected their competition toward developmental progress rather than military buildup, the result could be transformative for regional prosperity and stability. However, as long as the rivalry is defined by arms races and security posturing, the outcomes are likely to be destabilizing. Ultimately, while India and Pakistan may continue to pursue divergent goals, lasting peace in South Asia will remain out of reach unless their interests are reconciled. Genuine stability will require more than a temporary cease-fire — it will demand a fundamental reset grounded in mutual trust and a shared commitment to peaceful coexistence.

 

Naade Ali is currently serving as a Research Assistant to Dr. Marvin Weinbaum at MEI. He has more than five years of involvement working with international organizations and think tanks as a political researcher, policy advisor, peace strategist, and human rights practitioner with experience in human and national security, democratization, conflict resolution, and political culture. Prior to joining MEI, Ali worked with Media Foundation 360, a think tank dedicated to strengthening democratic practices in Pakistan.

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